体制内维权还是体制外抗争?——新生代农民工劳资冲突行为的演化博弈分析

Rights Protection inside the System or Protest outside the System:Study on Labor-capital Conflict Behavior in New Generation of Migrant Workers with Single Group-based Evolutionary Game Theory

基于单群体演化博弈理论,文章聚焦新生代农民工劳资冲突行为的群体扩散机制,发现新生代农民工劳资冲突变异行为的群体演化存在"体制内维权"与"体制外抗争"两种截然相反的趋势,而演化趋势的方向取决于初始状态中"体制外抗争"群体在总体中的比例。"体制外抗争"作为新时代的一种稳定策略均衡,仅凭"惩罚式"抑制将难以达到最终的制度均衡,设法提高"体制内维权"策略的个体收益支付以及群体收益支付总和,才是构建和谐劳资关系的必由之路。在当前劳资关系系统不完善的情况下,必须发挥政府的管理导向作用,在制度设计上设法提高体制内行为的收益,从而改变博弈参与人的预期,使其体制内行为比例超过一定的社会阈值,进而实现劳资关系向新的稳定均衡演化。

The group diffusion mechanism of labor-capital conflict behavior in new generation of migrant w orkers is studied w ith single group-based evolutionary game theory,and it is found that there are tw o diametrically opposed tendencies including the ＂rights protection inside the system ＂and＂protest outside the system＂in the evolution of groups of new-generation generations of migrant w orkers suffering from behaviors of labor-capital conflicts： The direction of the evolution trend depends on the proportion of the group of ＂protest outside of the system ＂in initial state. As a stable strategic balance in new era,it w ill be hard for the ＂protest outside of system ＂to achieve final balance of the system solely based on the ＂punitive-style ＂restraint,and it will be the necessity for the construction of harmonious labor-capital relationship to increase the sum of payment of individual benefits and that of group benefits in the ＂rights protection inside the system ＂strategy. It is required to give play to the promotion role of third-party factors including the government under current imperfect system of labor-capital relationship,and try to improve the benefits of behaviors inside the system in terms of the system design so as to change the expectation of game participants and enable the proportion of their behaviors inside the system to exceed a certain social threshold,thus achieving new,stable and balanced evolution of the labor-capital relationship.