摘要
通过构建一个信号博弈模型框架,分析农村资金互助合作社对农村中小微企业融资的影响,基于博弈模型的结构估计,能够较好地拟合农村资金互助合作社参与者—非参与者的融资额度分布。博弈模型的数值模拟结果表明:农村资金互助合作社的信用增级效应能够解释农村中小微企业融资额度溢价的89.87%,然而筛选效应的存在表明,农村资金互助合作社的规模盲目扩张可能导致参与者和非参与者的融资额度差距发生变化。
This paper establishes a framework of signal game model to study the impact of Rural Mutual Fund Cooperatives on financing of rural small and medium sized enterprises.Based on the structural estimation of the game model can better fit the distribution of financing quotas of Rural Mutual Fund Cooperatives between participants and non-participants.The numerical simulation results of game model show that:Credit enhancement effect of Rural Mutual Fund Cooperatives can explain 89.87% of rural small and medium sized enterprises financing amount premium.However,the existence of the screening effect indicates that the blind expansion of the Rural Mutual Fund Cooperatives may lead to a change in the margin gap between participants and non-participants.
作者
郭小叶
张中岩
张海燕
GUO Xiaoye;ZHANG Zhongyan;ZHANG Haiyan(School of Economics and Finance, Xi' an Jiaotong University, Xi'an 710061, China)
出处
《西北农林科技大学学报(社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第4期134-143,共10页
Journal of Northwest A&F University(Social Science Edition)
基金
国家社会科学基金重大项目(12&ZD071
14ZDA045)
国家社会科学基金青年项目(15CJL021)
关键词
农村资金互助合作社
农村中小微企业
融资额度
信号博弈
rural mutual fund cooperativesl rural small and medium sized enterprises
financing quota
signalgame