论实质价值伦理学与司法实践——对哈贝马斯关于价值与规范对立命题的反思

On Material Value Ethics and Judicial Practice: Reflection on Habermas's Proposition of the Opposition between Value and Norm

在司法实践中,由于法律规范的不确定性,一个可靠的判决推理需要有价值判断及其推理的支持。哈贝马斯认为法律规范是一个由原则提供的规范体系,反对将其理解为具体的价值秩序,从而把价值与规范作了严格的区分。如此虽有建构法律商谈理论的必要性,却与司法实践不符,且在主观上忽视了实质的价值伦理学。而马克斯·舍勒等则主张将规范奠基于价值之上,将价值与规范有机地结合起来,真正做到"以事实为依据",并主张将价值推理的现实必要性与法律规范确定性的理想要求统一,实现"合理的"判决推理。

In judicial practice, a reliable judgment reasoning needs the support of value judgment and reasoning due to the uncertainty of legal norms. Habermas considered legal rules as a system of norms supported by the principles, argued against that they belong to specific order values and strictly distinguished values from norms. Although there＇s the necessity to construct the legal discourse theory, it does not accord with the judicial practice and neglects the material value ethics subjectively. However, Max Scheler claimed that norms should be founded at the base of values. This paper agrees to combine norms with values organically, to ＂base on the facts＂ and to unify the practical necessity of value reasoning with the ideal requirement of legal norm, so as to realize reasonable judicial reasoning.