基于成本估算风险的武器装备激励价格合同模式

Incentive Price Contract Mode of Military Equipment Based on Cost Estimation Risk

武器装备研发成本超支是各国军队面临的共性难题,其原因主要是在武器装备研发阶段通常采用成本补偿合同,且在合同签订前武器装备承制单位(承制单位)过于乐观,对实际成本需求估计不足。通过采用激励价格合同模式,基于成本估算概率特性,结合项目成本风险等级,将承制单位成本估算概率映射为不同利润水平或损失等级,建立了基于成本估算风险的武器装备激励价格合同模式,促使承制单位在武器装备研发前提供更为客观的成本建议,降低成本超支风险,同时,提高军方武器装备研发项目的管控水平。

The overrun of military equipment Research and Development（ R＆D） is a common problem faced by the armies of the world. The main reason is that the cost compensation contract is usually adopted at the stage of military equipment R＆D,and it is too optimistic to estimate the actual cost demand before the contract is signed. By adopting the mode of incentive price contract,based on the probability characteristic of cost estimation and combined with the grade of project cost risk,the probability of estimating the military equipment contractor cost is mapped to different profit level or loss grade,and the incentive price contract mode of military equipment based on cost estimation is set up to force the military equipment contractor before military equipment R＆D to provide more objective cost proposals,reduce the risk of cost overrun and improve the management and control level of military equipment R＆D projects.