摘要
在分析物流服务供应链具体运作特点的基础上,探讨物流服务供应链多任务委托代理合作机制,对任务的可观测性、投入成本之间的关系及其对激励效能的影响进行分析,研究表明,基础物流任务和质量保障任务的可观测性不同及其投入成本的替代性关系,造成物流集成商激励效能的弱化,须引入集成商监督机制的委托代理模型。通过新激励机制的设计,物流集成商可以有效激励能力提供商,同时在两类物流任务中都提高投入水平,集成商的收益也得到提高。
Based on the analysis of the operational characteristics of Logistics Service Supply Chain( LSSC),the multi-task principle-agent cooperation mechanism is studied. The relationship between task observation degree and input costs,and their influence on the incentive mechanism in LSSC is analyzed. The research shows that the difference in observation degree between the basic logistics task and quality assurance task,and the substitutable relationship of input costs result in the weakened incentive performance of logistics service integrator. A principle-agent model with integrators' supervision is introduced in this paper.Through the design of new incentive mechanism,logistics integrators can effectively motivate suppliers while increasing the input levels in both types of logistics tasks and integrators' profitability.
作者
葛彩虹
季必发
GE Caihong;JI Bifa(Economics of Department, Hangzhou Institute of Administration, Hangzhou, Zhejiang, 310024, China;Public Policy Research Center of Hangzhou, Hangzhou, Zhejiang, 310026, China)
出处
《浙江树人大学学报》
2018年第1期53-59,共7页
Journal of Zhejiang Shuren University
关键词
服务业
物流业
物流服务供应链
委托代理
service industry
logistics industry
logistics service supply chain
principal-agent