基于演化博弈的造假者与监管方行为研究

Study on the Behavior of Counterfeiter and Regulators Based on Evolutionary Game

假货现象一直是困扰社会的重要问题。依据演化博弈论构建以造假者和监管方为博弈方的两方非对称博弈模型,分析造假者和监管方的行为及其原因。研究表明:市场中出现假货现象的重要原因是造假行为给造假者带来的净收益为正,其中造假者的心理成本、造假处罚以及造假被抓的概率对造假者的策略选择有重要影响。对于监管方,降低打击造假行为成本及提升相应的奖励收益比单纯增加其不作为时的处罚更能有效促使监管方严格执行打击策略,从而更加有效地抑制造假者造假行为。

The fake phenomenon has always been a serious social problem that has plagued society. Based on evolutionary game theory, this paper constructs an asymmetric evolutionary game model with counterfeiters and regulators as the game players,and analyzes the behavior and reasonof counterfeiters and regulators. The research shows that the important reason for the fake phenomenon in the market is that the net income of the counterfeiters is positive. The psychological costs of the counterfeiters, the penalties and the probability of arrest are important influence on the strategy choice of the counterfeiter.Regarding to regulators, reducing the cost of combating counterfeiting and increasing the rewards are more effective than simply increasing penalties for inaction in order to encourage regulators to strictly enforce a crackdown strategy,thereby more effective in restraining counterfeiters,counterfeiting behaviors.