摘要
本文分析并检验CEO雇佣高管或参与董事选拔、提名过程产生的关联对公司风险承担水平的影响以及CEO正式权力对此二者关系的调节作用。研究结果发现,(1)CEO通过参与董事选拔、提名过程产生的关联会显著降低公司的风险承担水平;(2)CEO正式权力,包括CEO结构性权力和所有权权力,削弱了CEO与董事之间的关联对公司风险承担水平的影响。本文的研究结论拓展现有关于公司风险承担和CEO关联的研究,同时为上市公司警惕CEO通过参与董事的选拔、提名过程建立私人关联,过度规避风险提供启示。
This paper examines how CEO connectedness by appointing other top executives or participating in the selection and nomination process of directors affects corporate risk-taking and the moderating effect of CEO formal power. The results show that：（ 1） CEO connectedness by participating in the selection and nomination process of directors significantly reduces the level of corporate risk-taking;（ 2） CEO formal power,including CEO structural power and ownership power,reduces the influence of CEO connectedness with directors on corporate risktaking. The conclusions expand existing researches on corporate risk-taking and CEO connectedness,and can remind listed companies that CEO may construct personal connections through participating in the selection and nomination process of directors,which may lead to excessive risk aversion to damage corporate potential earnings.
作者
李小玉
薛有志
周杰
LI Xiaoyu;XUE Youzhi;ZHOU Jie(Civil Aviation University of China ,Tianjin 300300;Nankai University, Tianjin 300071)
出处
《经济与管理研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第7期122-133,共12页
Research on Economics and Management
基金
国家自然科学基金项目"企业战略转型路径及其选择研究:以公司治理环境的约束性为视角"(71372092)
天津社科重点项目"以公司治理为视角的制造企业服务化转型动力机制研究"(TJGL16-005)
关键词
CEO关联
雇佣关系
建议提名
CEO正式权力
公司风险承担
CEO connectedness
employment relationship
recommended nominees
CEO formal power
corporate risk-taking
