存款保险、制度环境与商业银行风险承担——基于全球样本的经验证据

Deposit Insurance,Institution Environment and Commercial Bank Risk Taking: Based on the Evidence of the Global Sample

本文将1999年至2012年间的全球93个国家共4498家商业银行作为样本,运用前沿的双重差分模型,考察显性存款保险制度对银行风险承担的影响,并考察国家的监管、法律和政治制度环境对存款保险制度运行效果的影响。实证结果表明:存款保险制度在总体上确实产生了道德风险,使银行的风险承担增加,但这一效应会因不同国家的经济发达程度而异;在发达国家,存款保险制度没有产生不良效应,而在发展中国家,存款保险制度明显增加了银行的风险承担。监管、法律和政治环境与银行风险承担的关系研究表明,在发达国家中,三者均与银行风险呈正相关,这意味着良好的制度环境有助于降低银行风险承担程度。而在发展中国家,只有监管环境呈现有益效应;监管、法律和政治环境与存款保险的交互效应为负,这意味着良好的制度环境有助于减轻存款保险的道德风险问题。

In this paper,we use a total of 4498 commercial banks of the world′s 93 countries between 1999 to 2012 as the sample,and take DID model to study the impact of the deposit insurance on bank risk-taking,and discuss the country′s sophisticated regulatory,legal and political system environment influence on the operating results of the deposit insurance system.The empirical results show that the deposit insurance system in general does have a moral hazard,which also makes the bank’s risk exposures increase,but this effect will vary with depending on the level of economic development;in developed countries,the deposit insurance system does not produce adverse effects. In the developing countries,the deposit insurance system significantly increases the bank′s risk taking. The relationship between regulatory,legal and political environment and bank risk exposures in developed countries is significantly positive which means a good system environment helps reduce the level of bank risk taking. In developing countries,only regulatory environment shows the beneficial effects. And interaction between the regulatory environment,legal environment,political environment and deposit insurance is negative which means that a good institutional environment helps mitigate the moral hazard problem of the deposit insurance.