间接购买人诉讼、最优竞争法实施与政策选择

Indirect Purchaser Litigations,Optimal Competition Enforcement,and Policy Choice

最优竞争法实施理论建构了一套高效的竞争法实施体系,其核心是界分私人实施的赔偿目标与公共实施的威慑目标;在此基础上的推理严密化了间接购买人诉权的理论基础,但也提示了次优竞争法实施模式的基础。欧盟和德国法最近的政策经验提示,符合最优竞争法实施的激励间接购买人诉讼的政策在实体规则和程序规则上均面临诸多有力批评,且转向激励政策存在理论和制度门槛。此外,竞争法治的推进也有不亚于理论深化和制度设计的重要性。因此,尽管激励政策是可欲的目标,但应当保守且审慎地转向该政策。对潜在的政策选择及中国法背景的综合分析表明应由次优竞争法实施稳健地过渡到最优竞争法实施,即在一段时间内采取保守的原则性的直接购买人诉权集中政策,推进理论、经验、制度与竞争法治的发展,逐步转向激励间接购买人诉讼的竞争法实施政策。

Optimal competition enforcement theory establishes an effective system of competition enforcement by focusing on different ends of private enforcement and public enforcement, namely compensation and deterrence. Based thereon, the deduction successfully causesthe rationale for the standing of indirect purchasers more rigorous while reveals the rationale of suboptimal competition enforcement. Latest experience of EU and German law indicates that the theory and practice of indirect purchaser litigations, whether in regards of substantive or procedural rules, are facing strong critics,and that a threshold exists for turning into a policy of incitement.The improvement of rule of law in market competition is equally or more important than the development of theory and the design of a system. Given the possible policy options and the context of Chinese law,a transition from suboptimal to optimal competitionenforcement is more desired, meaningthe adoption of a more conservativeconcentration of direct purchaser standing in principleduring a period of time with the development of theory, experience, system, and rule of law in market competition and a gradual turninto a competition enforcement policy focusing on inciting the litigation of indirect purchasers.