基于批发价格事前和事后决策的供应链合作促销策略研究

Research on supply chain cooperation promotion strategy based on wholesale price ex-ante and ex-post decision

针对单一供应商和单一零售商组成的二级供应链系统,构建了批发价格事前和事后决策下的合作促销模型,探讨了批发价格事前和事后决策对合作促销的影响,并求得Stackelber主从博弈下的均衡合作促销策略。研究结果表明,在批发价格事前决策且零售商努力影响需求、或批发价格事后决策且供应商努力影响需求的情形下,合作促销均不是一个有效的激励策略;在批发价格事前决策且供应商努力影响需求的情形下,只有当促销努力成本共担系数小于一定的阈值时,合作促销才是一个有效的激励策略;在批发价格事后决策且零售商努力影响需求的情形下,合作促销始终是有效的激励策略。最后通过算例分析验证了上述结论的有效性。

This paper considered a two echelon supply chain consisting of one supplier and one retailer. Through constructing the model of cooperative promotion under the wholesale price ex-ante and ex-post decision,it discussed the influence of wholesale price ex-ante and ex-post decision on cooperation promotion,and obtained the equilibrium cooperation promotion strategy under the stackelberg game. Research results show that： when wholesale price ex-ante decision and the retailer efforts to influence demand,or wholesale price ex-post decision and the supplier efforts to influence demand,the cooperative promotion is not an effective incentive strategy. When wholesale price ex-ante decision and the supplier efforts to influence demand,only the condition that sales effort cost sharing coefficient is less than a certain threshold,cooperative promotion is an effective incentive strategy. When wholesale price ex-post decision and the retailer efforts to influence demand,cooperative promotion is always an effective incentive strategy. At last,it verified the validity of the conclusion by an example.