摘要
针对单一供应商和单一零售商组成的二级供应链系统,构建了批发价格事前和事后决策下的合作促销模型,探讨了批发价格事前和事后决策对合作促销的影响,并求得Stackelber主从博弈下的均衡合作促销策略。研究结果表明,在批发价格事前决策且零售商努力影响需求、或批发价格事后决策且供应商努力影响需求的情形下,合作促销均不是一个有效的激励策略;在批发价格事前决策且供应商努力影响需求的情形下,只有当促销努力成本共担系数小于一定的阈值时,合作促销才是一个有效的激励策略;在批发价格事后决策且零售商努力影响需求的情形下,合作促销始终是有效的激励策略。最后通过算例分析验证了上述结论的有效性。
This paper considered a two echelon supply chain consisting of one supplier and one retailer. Through constructing the model of cooperative promotion under the wholesale price ex-ante and ex-post decision,it discussed the influence of wholesale price ex-ante and ex-post decision on cooperation promotion,and obtained the equilibrium cooperation promotion strategy under the stackelberg game. Research results show that: when wholesale price ex-ante decision and the retailer efforts to influence demand,or wholesale price ex-post decision and the supplier efforts to influence demand,the cooperative promotion is not an effective incentive strategy. When wholesale price ex-ante decision and the supplier efforts to influence demand,only the condition that sales effort cost sharing coefficient is less than a certain threshold,cooperative promotion is an effective incentive strategy. When wholesale price ex-post decision and the retailer efforts to influence demand,cooperative promotion is always an effective incentive strategy. At last,it verified the validity of the conclusion by an example.
作者
王永龙
蹇明
Wang Yonglong;Jian Mint(School of Transportation & Logistics,Southwest Jiaotong University,Chengdu 610031,China)
出处
《计算机应用研究》
CSCD
北大核心
2018年第6期1686-1690,1706,共6页
Application Research of Computers
基金
2016年度四川省学术和技术带头人培养支持经费资助项目
重庆市基础与前沿研究计划一般项目(cstc2013jcyj A0998)
成都市科技计划项目(2015-RK00-00207-ZF)
关键词
批发价格事前决策
批发价格事后决策
合作促销
wholesale price ex-ante decision
wholesale price ex-post decision
cooperative promotion