网络公益信息风险与治理机制研究——以企业公益为视角

随着"互联网+"战略的实施,公益活动得以借助各类网络平台持续发力,而由于信息监管不到位,网络公益失范现象掺杂其中。基于微信"熟人社会"的性质,信息更带有先天的易信任优势,这给企业虚假网络公益带来更大的运营空间。通过对信息规制的成本效益分析明确其法律正当性,并在此基础上架构以公权力主体、微信平台和企业为主体的综合协调机制,形成企业参与网络公益的良性循环,是研究的核心方向。

With the implementation of the ＂Internet＋ strategy＂ , public welfare activities have been able to continue to use all kinds of network platforms. However, due to the lack of information supervision, the phenomenon of network public interest misbehavior has been included. Based on the nature of WeChat＇s ＂acquaintance society＂, information is more congenitally predominantly trustworthy, which brings greater operational space to the company＇s false network public interest. Through the analysis of the cost-benefit analysis of information regulation, its legitimacy is clarified, and on this basis, a comprehensive coordination mechanism based on public power entities, WeChat platforms, and enterprises is formed to form a virtuous cycle in which companies participate in network public welfare. This is the core direction of research.