国企多元化并购异象的根源与市场反应——基于制度基础观的研究

Roots and Market Reaction of State-owned Enterprises' Diversified M&A Anomalies——Research on the Basis of Institutional Foundation

鉴于"多元化折价"的普遍存在,20世纪80年代开始,国外企业纷纷降低多元化程度,转向归核化。与此同时国内企业却一直如火如荼地进行多元化并购。文章提出转轨经济环境下政府干预和内部人控制并存的制度特征导致政府和内部人希冀于借助国有企业多元化并购活动实现自身目标,由此引发国企超乎寻常热衷于多元化并购的异常现象。文章系统梳理政府和内部人影响国企多元化并购的制度根源,并以1281起国有上市公司多元化并购事件为样本,实证检验多元化并购的市场反应。研究表明,国企多元化并购存在"并购绩效悖论",这种价值毁损主要来自于地方国企。政府干预对市场反应具有积极影响,且能一定程度抑制内部人控制带来的消极市场反应。

Because of the general existence of ＂diversification discount＂, foreign enterprises have reduced the degree of diversification from 1980s and turned to reintegration. At the same time, domestic enterprises have keened on diversified mergers and acquisitions like a raging fire. In the transforming economic environments, government and insiders have the ability and motivation to achieve their goals via enterprises＇ diversified M＆A, which leading to State-owned enterprises＇ anomalies of diversified M＆A. This paper combings the instirutional background of government and insiders＇ influence on M＆A, and then takes state-owned listing corporations＇ M＆A event happened in 2005-2016 as samples to test these two factors＇ effection on CAR. Result shows that, there is ＂performance paradox＂ in State-owned enterprises＇s diversified M＆A, which mainly comes from the local state-owned enterprises. Government intervention has a positive impact on the market reaction, while insider control has negative impact. Government intervention can restrain insider control.