存款保险制度如何影响公众对不同银行的信心?——来自中国的证据

How does Deposit Insurance System Affect Different Banks?Evidence from China

在政府对于银行具有隐性担保的经济体中,引入存款保险制度会对不同的银行带来什么影响,是个有待学术界研究的重要问题。本文利用中国推出存款保险制度这个准自然实验,首次通过事件研究法实证检验和识别了市场对于隐性担保和存款保险的看法。研究发现,短期内,存款保险制度让公众对于某些银行的存款更加不放心:存款保险制度的推出对于规模较大、全国性的国有银行和股份制银行的冲击并不显著,而对于规模较小、地方性的城市商业银行有较为显著的负向效应。一个可能的解释是,存款保险制度将政府隐性担保显性化;这种冲击对小银行更明显,而公众还是相信大型国有银行和全国性股份制银行会"大而不倒"。

It is still an open question what effects introducing deposit insurance systems （hereafter, ＂DIS＂） have on financial institutions in economies with implicit government guarantees. The paper exploits a quasi - natural experiment and uses event study methodology to estimate the effects. The results show that DIS actually makes smaller banks less trustworthy; DIS had more negative effects on small and local banks than large state - owned and shareholding banks. One explanation is that DIS has made implicit government guarantees explicit, leading to fears that guarantees for smaller banks will only be partial, while state - owned banks are believed to be ＂too big to fail＂.