房地产开发雨水利用激励机制研究

A Study on the Incentive Mechanism of Rainwater Utilization for Real Estate Development

我国房地产开发雨水利用的发展面临开发商动力不足与政府激励力度不足两大问题。遵循激励理论和博弈理论,分析雨水利用的外部性特征,量化雨水利用全生命周期成本效益,评估非对称信息下政府与开发商间的博弈关系,设计政府对开发商的经济激励模型。研究发现:开发商努力程度不可观测时,最优的政府激励机制要求开发商在获得激励同时承担一定的风险成本。激励成本与开发商的风险规避程度和外生随机变量方差正相关,与开发商努力边际成本和溢出性收益负相关。并采用算例分析实际操作中政府最优激励水平,为制定激励政策提供依据。

The utilization of rainwater during real estate development is facing two major problems in China： the lack of motivations for developers and insufficient government incentives. Following incentive theory and game theory, the external characteristics of rainwater utilization are analyzed, the cost-effectiveness of rainwater utilization in the whole life cycle is quantified, the game between governments and developers under asymmetric information is evaluated, and the economic incentive model of governments to developers is designed. It is found that the optimal government incentive mechanism requires developers to share certain risk costs while obtaining incentives when the efforts of developers are unobservable. Incentive cost is positively correlated with risk aversion and variance of exogenous random variables, and negatively correlated with marginal cost of developers＇ efforts and spillover benefits. An empirical study is used to analyze the optimal incentive level of governments in practice, which provides a solid foundation for formulating incentive policies.