垄断网购平台的质量诚信监管动态行为

Research of dynamic behavior of captive online shopping platform about integrity supervision of quality

产品质量诚信危机已成为制约当前网购市场发展的障碍,这一定程度上源于网购平台对在线商家的质量诚信监管不力。关于网购平台的质量诚信监管行为,现有文献进行了有益的探索,但尚未对其动态行为进行分析。基于双边市场理论,采用最优控制模型分析了由在线消费者、诚信在线商家、非诚信在线商家和网购平台构成的网购市场中,网购平台质量诚信监管力度的演化行为。通过数学模型和实证分析,发现在网购平台垄断某类商品时,随着网购平台经营周期的增加、或者随着网购平台双边用户规模的增大,网购平台的质量诚信监管力度呈现先增后减的趋势。因此,不能完全寄希望于网购平台对网购市场质量诚信的治理,需要引入平台企业间的竞争机制或建立平台和政府的二元治理机制。

The crisis about quality integrity of online shopping has already became a hinder Restricting the development of online shopping market,in a certain extent,it due to the online shopping platform didn＇t put on enough effort in quality integrity supervision to online sellers.The current literature has carried on the beneficial exploration to the quality integrity supervision of online purchase platform,but there isn＇t a research that discuss on the dynamic behavior of online shopping platform supervision.Based on the two-side market theory,this paper analysis the dynamic behavior of online shopping platform supervision on the online shopping market that consists of online consumers,honest online sellers,non-honest online sellers and online shopping platforms.Through establishing the optimal control model and conducting the empirical analysis,we can draw the conclusion that the online shopping platform will increase quality control first and then reduce quality control With the increase of the business cycle of the online shopping platform,or with the increase of the scale of the bilateral users of the online shopping platform,when a certain type of goods is monopolized by an online shopping platform.Therefore,we can not rely entirely the governance of quality integrity by online shopping platform,we need to introduce competition mechanism between platform enterprises or establish dual governance mechanism of platform and government.