基于博弈论的汽车企业“双积分”政策问题研究

Research on the “double integral” Policy of Automobile enterprises based on Game Theory

新能源汽车产业作为我国七大战略性新兴产业之一,其稳健发展离不开政府的支持。针对工信部2017年9月出台的CAFC、NEV双积分政策,以博弈论为基础,构建汽车企业与政府之间的两阶段博弈模型。提出燃油汽车与新能源汽车之间替代程度的概念,通过博弈模型分析"双积分"政策对汽车企业以及汽车市场的影响,同时研究在节能减排与推广新能源汽车目标下政府的最优决策问题。针对研究结果,给出合理建议,以期为政府推进新能源汽车的发展提供参考。

The new energy vehicle industry is one of the seven strategic emerging industries in China. Its steady development is inseparable from government support. Aiming at the CAFC and NEV double integral policy introduced by the Ministry of industry and Commerce in September 2017,based on game theory,the two stage game model between automobile enterprises and government is built. The concept of substitution degree between fuel vehicle and new energy vehicle is put forward,and the game model is used to analyze the influence of ＂double integral＂ policy on automobile enterprises and the automobile market. At the same time,the optimal decision problem of the government is studied under the goal of energy saving and emission reduction and the promotion of new energy vehicles. According to the research results,reasonable suggestions are provided for the government to promote the development of new energy vehicles industry.