基于博弈论的中小机场旅客出行选择研究

Research on passenger choice based on game theory in small and medium-sized airport

针对大型枢纽机场对周边中小机场的"虹吸效应"所产生的中小机场旅客量不足、枢纽机场日益拥堵等问题,提出了一个优化运营方案:调整机场航班频率与票价,引导中小机场旅客选择中小机场出行.基于Logit模型分析中小机场旅客出行选择行为,以票价和频率为竞争策略变量,建立枢纽机场和中小机场的非合作博弈模型,给出纯策略和混合策略Nash均衡解的存在性和计算方法.最后结合实例对模型进行验证,结果表明均衡条件下的航班频率与票价有利于提高中小机场旅客出行的社会效益.

An optimal operation method was proposed to solve the problem of passenger shortage in the small and medium-sized airports and congestion in the hub airport,which aroused by the＇siphon effect＇of small and medium-sized airports surrounding the hubs. The method was consist of adjusting the frequency and ticket fares of airlines,which will help passengers prefer to take small and medium-sized airports as their first choice. Based on the Logit model,the travel choice behavior of passengers in small and medium-sized airport was analyzed. By considering the fare and frequency to be competitive strategy variables,a non-cooperative game model was established between direct air travel and the air-rail transportation,where the existence of pure and mixed Nash equilibrium was demonstrated and calculated. An example was investigated for model validating. The results showed that the flight frequency and fare under the condition of equilibrium would improve the social benefits of passenger travel in small and medium airports.