摘要
绿色发展理想形态与社会制度形态长期角力,集中表现为地方党政领导政绩诉求所传导的制约性作用。藉此延展官员晋升激励的视角,可以综合分析2006—2015年长江经济带城市的相关数据,整体考察政绩诉求对城市绿色发展的影响。通过建模研究发现,政绩诉求越大的地区,城市绿色发展的阻力越大。三个体现政绩诉求的具体指标中,增长诉求、就业诉求、财政诉求构成一定差序格局。增长诉求对绿色发展的负面作用最大,说明在以GDP为核心的考核体系下,"保增长"对官员晋升激励会使其放松环境规制,通过粗放型的发展道路追求短期政绩;其次为就业诉求,财政诉求的负面作用最小。上级政府和公众媒体对环境问题的关注将减弱政绩诉求的负面作用,表现为政绩诉求对绿色发展的阻碍在沿江城市小于非沿江城市。上述专题研究,可以为完善政绩考核体制、推动城市绿色发展提供重要资鉴。
The long-term struggle between the ideal form of green development and the social system form is mainly reflected in the restraint effect of the demand of local party and government leaders for political achievements. From the perspective of extending the promotion incentive of officials, relevant data of cities within the Yangtze River Economic Belt from 2006 to 2015 can be comprehensively analyzed, and the overall impact of political performance demands on urban green development can be investigated. Through modeling research, it is found that the greater the demand for political achievements is, the greater the resistance to urban green development will be. Among the three specific indicators that reflect the demands of political performance, the demand on economic growth, employment and finance constitute a pattern of difference, the demand on economic growth exerts negative effects on the green development, which implies that the existing inspection system of taking GDP as the core will cause government officials to keep environmental regulation in the shadow and to turn to extensive ways of development for the pursuit of short-term performance. Claims for employment exert less negative effects and financial appeals bring out the least negative effects. The concern of higher-level government and public media on environmental issues will reduce the negative effects brought by the demand for political achievements, which is reflected by the fewer hinders in riverside cities than in non-riverside cities. The above studies can provide important references for improving the performance appraisal system and promoting the green development of cities.
作者
贺晓宇
韩保江
HE Xiao-yu;HAN Bao-jiang(School of Economics,Nanjing University,Nanjing 210093,China;School of Economics,Party School of the CPC Central Committee,Beijing 100091,China)
出处
《南通大学学报(社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第4期33-40,共8页
Journal of Nantong University:Social Sciences Edition
基金
国家社科基金重大项目(14ZDA023)
国家社科基金项目(16BJL065)
关键词
政绩诉求
绿色发展
长江经济带
SBM模型
political achievement demand
green development
the Yangtze River Economic Belt
SBM Mode