摘要
立足于农村宅基地制度改革,运用模型分析法,通过构建博弈模型分析地方政府与农户之间的利益关系,并从博弈论的角度探索农户退出宅基地过程中存在的问题。建议通过完善相关的法律法规,增强农户法律法规意识;探索宅基地的退补机制,保障农户土地财产权益;明确政府职能角色定位,激发农户退出宅基地等路径来实现两个利益主体之间的利益均衡,达到共赢的局面。
Based on the institutional reform of the countryside homestead,by using model analysis method,this paper,through building a game model tries to clarify relationship between the farmer household and local government,and explores the existing questions in the process of farmer household quitting rural homestead from the perspective of game theory. So,the paper provides some referential suggestions as followings: by perfecting relevant laws and regulations to strengthen the awareness of laws and regulations of farmers; by exploring the subsidy mechanism of the homestead to protect the land property rights of farmers; by clarifying the role of government functions,stimulate farmers to quit the homestead and other paths to balance the interests between the two stakeholders,and achieve a win-win situation.
作者
范怀超
王粞
崔久富
FAN Huaichao;WANG Xi;CUI Jiufu(School of Management,China West Normal University,Nanehong 637700,Chin)
出处
《重庆理工大学学报(社会科学)》
CAS
2018年第7期80-87,共8页
Journal of Chongqing University of Technology(Social Science)
基金
四川省教育发展研究中心立项资助项目"土地适度经营中家庭农场主素质提升教育研究"(CJF15060)
西华师范大学英才科研基金项目"农地流转与适度规模利用协调性研究"(17YC058)
2017年国家级大学生创新创业训练计划项目"三权分置视域下农地流转机制运行绩效评价与优化"(201710638035)
西华师范大学2016年大学生创新创业项目"西部地区农户宅基地退出意愿调查研究--以贵阳市花溪区为例"(cxcy2016126)
关键词
农村宅基地
宅基地退出补偿机制
农户
博弈行为
rural homestead
subsidy mechanism of quitting rural homestead farmer household
game behavior