地方政府环境偏好与中国环境分权管理体制的环保效应

Environmental Protection Effect of Environmental Preference of Local Government and Chinese Environmental Decentralization

分析了地方政府环境偏好和中国式环境分权对环境保护的作用机理,用地方政府收取的环境相关税费占GDP的比重衡量地方政府环境偏好,用不同层级政府间环境管理人员的配置衡量中国式环境分权度,基于2006—2015年中国省际面板数据,实证检验了地方政府环境偏好和中国式环境分权的环保效应和门槛效应。结果表明:地方政府环境偏好具有环保正效应,中国式环境分权具有环保负效应;两者的环保效应具有显著的门槛效应,且两者在环保效应上相互牵制。在样本期内的300个观测值中,仅有28个观测值同时处于地方政府环境偏好的高门槛区域和中国式环境分权的低门槛区域,占总观测值的9.33%。鉴于此,地方政府环境偏好应进一步提升,同时中央政府应进行适度的环境集权,以显著提升对环境保护的正效应。

Firstly,this paper analyzes the mechanisms of local government environmental preference and Chinese environmental decentralization on environmental protection.Then it measures local government environmental preference by the proportion of environmental related tax and fee collected by local government to GDP,and the degree of Chinese environmental decentralization by the allocation of intergovernmental environmental managers at different levels.And it analyzes empirically environmental protection effect and threshold effect of local government environmental preference and Chinese environmental decentralization by using the panel data during 2006-2015.The results show as follows：local government environmental preference has a positive effect on environmental protection,and Chinese environmental decentralization has a negative effect on it;both of them have significant threshold effects and mutual restraint on environmental effects;in the sample period,only 28 of the 300 observed values are both in the high threshold region of local government environmental preference and low threshold region of Chinese environmental decentralization,accounting for 9.33% of total observed.Therefore,local government environmental preference should be enhanced,and central government should moderate environmental centralization to increase the positive effect on environmental protection significantly.