摘要
苏德超和张稆元在探讨自由意志的问题时,执着于西方主流学界有关自由与必然的二元对立架构,一方面将自由感与自由的存在分离开来,另一方面认为人性的必然逻辑会取消人们的自由和选择。这种把随意任性混同于随机偶然的研究路径不但会否定人们对自己的行为理应承担的自主责任,而且也会让自由本身沦为某种不可知不可解的虚幻之谜,从而陷入自败的泥潭。
In discussing the issue of free will, Su Dechao and Zhang Lvyuan are still attached to the dichotomy between freedom and necessity set up by the Western mainstream philosophy. On the one hand, they separate the sense of freedom from the factual existence of freedom; on the other hand, they think that the inevitable logic of human nature would cancel human freedom and choice. Such an approach of confusing freedom with chanciness will not only negate people’s responsibility for their own actions out of their free will, it will also make freedom a totally unknowable and illusory mystery in its self-defeat.
作者
刘清平
LIU Qingping(Fudan Institute of Advanced Study in Social Sciences,Fudan University,Shanghai,200433,China;School of Humanities,Wuhan College of Communication,Wuhan,Hubei,430205,China)
出处
《贵州大学学报(社会科学版)》
2018年第4期26-38,共13页
Journal of Guizhou University(Social Sciences)