社会生产力最大化假设下经济区规模决定模型分析

The Economic Zone's Scale Determination Model based on Social Productivity Maximization

以社会生产力最大化行政目标为基础,构建政府-企业博弈关系作为经济区规模决定模型,挖掘影响经济区规模的决定性因素,并通过对模型进行经济学内涵拓展,讨论政府在经济区运行过程中应采取的合理行为策略。结果表明:在自利决策机制下的政府-企业行为博弈中,企业入驻经济区的成本是影响经济区最优规模最重要的因素,在经济区最优规模形成过程中,政府调节手段都是围绕如何激励企业进行自主技术革新、降低入驻成本上限展开的,其中最核心的政府行为主要包括两点:(1)如果以社会生产力最大化为行政目标,那么政府最好不要对辖区内企业直接进行专项资金投入或与之类似的财政补贴,而是让企业能够自主安排生产经营活动以适应市场环境;(2)在激励企业自主降低入驻成本上限的策略选择上,政府应该采取"少索取"而非"多给予"策略。

The paper aims at constructing the government-enterprise game relationship as the economic zone′s scale determination model to dig into the decisive factors in influencing the economic zone′scale based on the administrative objectives of social productivity maximization.Meanwhile,it is designed to discuss the reasonable behavioral strategy for the government in the economic operational process by the economical connotation extension of the model.The research indicates that the cost of the enterprise to invest and operate in the economic zones is the critical factor to influence the scale maximization in the government-enterprise game relationship in the self-profited system.In the formation of the optimal scale of economic zone,the government′s regulation means centers on how to stimulate the enterprises to innovate technology independently and reduce the entry cost upper limit,of which the core government behavior should include the following two points.The first point means that when the social productivity maximization is seen as the administrative objective,it is better for government to allow the enterprises to arrange their own production and operation activities to adapt to the market rather than put in special funds to the enterprises in its jurisdiction or offer financial subsidies.The second is that the government should adopt the strategy of ＂taking less＂ rather than ＂giving more＂ to encourage the enterprises to reduce the entry cost upper limit independently.