二元金融、社会网络与家庭借贷——基于重复博弈模型和CFPS数据的实证检验

Binary Finance,Social Network and Household Lending——An Empirical Test Based on Repeated Game Model and CFPS Data

本文研究二元金融背景下社会网络与家庭借贷行为的作用关系,发现社会网络有助于家庭在非人格化交易环境中达成借贷契约,从而缓解信贷约束。根据无限期界的重复博弈分析可知:社会网络在家庭借贷中的惩罚机制和声誉效应能够降低借方的违约动机。通过实证分析及稳健性检验表明:从总体上看,社会网络能够显著提升家庭获得正规金融与非正规金融的借贷概率,社会网络在非人格化特征显著的正规金融上也发挥作用;从融资偏好上看,社会网络强度越大,越有利于在非人格化交易条件下促成契约;从城乡对比来看,社会网络更有助于农户与陌生的交易对手达成借贷契约,而城市家庭则缺乏统计上的显著性。这意味着,不仅非正规金融借贷需要社会网络来进行契约治理,而且在正规金融借贷中也应该实现关系型治理与规范型治理的充分结合。

This paper studies the relationship between social networks and family lending behavior in the context of dual finance and finds that social networks can help families reach lending contracts in an impersonal transaction en- vironment, thus alleviating credit constraints. According to the analysis of repeated games in an infinite period of time, we can see that the punishment mechanism and reputation effect of social networks in household lending can re- duce the borrower＇s default motivation. Through empirical analysis and robustness test, it is shown that, overall, so- cial network can significantly increase the probability of households obtaining regular loans and informal financial loans, and social network also plays a role in formal finance with significant non-personalized characteristics. From the perspective of financing preference, the greater the social network strength, the more conducive to the contract under the conditions of non-personalized transactions; from the comparison of urban and rural areas, the social network is more conducive to farmers and strange counter parties to reach a lending contract, while urban families are lack of sta- tistical significance. This means that not only informal financial lending requires social networks for contractual gover- nance, but also in formal financial lending, full integration of relational and normative governance should be achieved.