多利益主体参与下主动配电网完全信息动态博弈行为

Dynamic Games of Complete Information in Active Distribution Network with Multi-Stakeholder Participation

随着电力市场进一步开放,主动配电网电能交易的多元化、复杂化为主动配电网的调度运行带来了新的挑战。针对主动配电网多利益主体参与下的调度问题,提出了多利益主体参与下主动配电网完全信息动态博弈策略。首先,考虑分布式电源、需求响应等调度资源,引入改进的"梯形效用函数模型",建立了完全信息动态博弈下包括配电网运营商与负荷聚合商在内的多利益主体响应行为模型;其次,基于韦伯-费希纳定律,提出了序贯议价函数以表征序贯议价动态博弈中各参与人的博弈行为;最后,研究了主动配电网完全信息动态博弈流程,提出了动态博弈粒子群优化算法对问题进行求解。以华中某地级市实际配网为例,仿真结果验证了模型的有效性,结果还表明在开放电力市场环境下,主动配电网的完全信息动态博弈在兼顾各参与人利益的同时,降低了边际发电成本,实现了社会总效益与风电消纳量的提升。

With the further opening up of the electricity market, the diversification and complication of the transaction has brought new challenges for the active distribution network scheduling operation. The strategy of the dynamic game with complete information in active distribution network（ADN） has been proposed for the coordination problem of ADN. Firstly, considering the scheduling resources such as distributed generation, demand response and so on, an improved ＂trapezoidal utility function model＂ is introduced to establish a multi-stakeholder response behavior model including distribution network operators and load aggregators under the complete information dynamic game; Secondly, based on Weber Fischer＇s Law, a sequential bargaining function is present to characterize the game behavior of each participant in the dynamic game of sequential bargaining; Finally, the flow of dynamic game with complete information in ADN is studied, and the dynamic game particle swarm optimization algorithm is put forward to solve the problem. Taking the actual distribution network in central China as an example, the simulation results has verified the validity of the model. The results also show that the dynamic game with complete information in active distribution network shows following benefits： lower marginal power generation costs, more wind power consumption and higher total social benefits.