主动再制造设计下制造/再制造博弈模型研究

Study on game model of manufacture/remanufacture based on designing for remanufacturing

为了分析主动再制造设计对原始制造商与再制造商竞争机理的影响,建立了原始制造商与再制造商博弈模型.模型考虑并对比分析了由原始制造商承担再制造设计费用和由再制造商承担再制造设计费用两种情况下,主动再制造设计对废旧产品边界回收率、两种产品的单位零售价格、销售量及销售利润的影响.研究结果表明:在再制造产品不进入市场时,由原始制造商主动再制造设计能降低单位新产品的零售价格、增加新产品的销售量及销售利润;主动再制造设计为两种产品带来的单位收益之比在某一区间时,无论由原始制造商或由再制造商承担再制造设计费用,原始制造商都会选择进行再制造设计.

This paper establishes a game model between an original equipment manufacturer（OEM） and a remanufacturer in order to analyze the effect of designing for remanufacturing on the competition between the OEM and remanufacturer. Based on this model, two conditions are taken into account： One is that the OEM charges the fee for designing for remanufacturing, the other is that the remanufacturer charges the fee for designing for remanufacturing. Then the effect of designing for remanufacturing on the border recovery rate of waste products is analyzed. The unit retail price of the new/remaufacturered products, the sales and the sales profits are analyzed and compared under the two conditions. The results are： the unit retail price could be lowered, and the sales and the sales profits could be increased for the new products through designing for remanufacturing if the remanufactured products does not enter the market; the OEM will be willing to choose designing for remanufacturing, regardless of whether the OEM or the remanufacturer collects the fee for designing for remanufacturing, when the ratio between the unit benefits of the two products from designing for remanufacturing falls within certain intervals.