分行薪酬考核激励、信息收集和信贷决策

Bank Branch Performance Compensation,Information Collection and Lending Decisions

本文借助一家城市商业银行的分行绩效考核办法,利用贷款层面的微观数据,研究绩效奖励对信贷决策的影响。发现享受更高绩效奖励的分行,会对单笔贷款申请提供更高的金额、更长的期限,而且贷后违约率更低,尤其是期限较短的贷款。进一步的分析发现,享受更高绩效奖励的分行发放的贷款利率更能准确预测贷后违约率,说明提高绩效奖励促进了分行员工更有效的信息收集。本文还发现,银行为企业提供以新还旧,主要是给予资信良好的企业持续的信贷支持,而非掩盖坏账,且以新还旧的做法不会影响本文的结论。

This paper studies the effect of performance compensation on commercial bank branches＇ lending behavior with loan-level date from an urban commercial bank in China. We find that branches with a higher share of their profit as compensation tend to make loans with a significantly higher amount and longer maturity, and the default ratio on these loans is also significantly lower, especially for short-term loans. Further analysis shows that the interest rate charged by these branches can better predict ex post loan default ratio, indicating better information collection and utilization by these high-incentived branches. We also provide evidence that loan rollover is mostly provided to high-quality firms instead of as an attempt to delay default. Therefore, loan rollover does not affect the measure of loan quality with actual default and hence our findings.