随机需求下物流服务供应链订购策略研究

Ordering Decision in Logistics Service Supply Chain with Stochastic Demand

针对由单个物流服务提供商和集成商组成的物流服务供应链,基于集中化模式、纳什博弈模式和Stackelberg博弈模式三种典型模式,考虑市场需求随机且受服务质量缺陷承诺水平的影响,探讨物流服务供应链的订购与质量缺陷承诺策略问题。通过分析发现:物流服务质量缺陷承诺水平随着市场需求弹性系数的增加而递减,但其受物流服务集成商观测水平的影响却因合作模式不同而变化不一致;集中化模式下的物流服务订购量随着物流服务集成商观测水平或市场需求弹性系数的增大而递减,但在其他两种合作模式下物流服务订购量随着物流服务集成商观测水平或市场需求弹性系数的增加而增加;在三种模式下,物流服务供应链的整体利润随着市场需求弹性系数的增加而递减,但其受物流服务集成商观测水平的影响却因合作模式不同而变化不一致。

This paper considers a logistics supply chain with a logistics services integrator and a functional logistics service provider, where customers demand is a stochastic exponential function of quality defect rate guarantee of functional logistics service provider. In order to explore the ordering and quality defect rate guarantee decision problem of the logistics service supply chain, the optimal ordering and quality defect rate guarantee of logistics service integrator and functional logistics service provider are presented under three typical game modes： centralized decisions, Nash game, Stackelberg game. Through analysis, it is found that the quality defects rate guarantee is decreased in market demand elasticity coefficient, but the impact of the observation level of logistics services integrator on the quality defects rate guarantee varies with different typical game modes; in the centralized mode, the ordering is decreased with the observation level of logistics services integrator or market demand elasticity coef- ficient, while the ordering is increased with the observation level of logistics services integrator or market demand elasticity coefficient in the other typical game modes; Additionally, in the three different typical game modes, the overall profit of logistics service supply chain is decreased with market demand elasticity coefficient, but has different relationship with the observation level of logistics services integrator in different typical game modes.