企业间游说竞争如何影响反倾销裁决

How Does the Lobbying Competition between Enterprises Affect the Antidumping Decision

反倾销裁决应是政府主管部门实现战略性产业保护的合理抉择,但国内外利益集团通过各种游说竞争方式以影响反倾销裁决结果,反倾销裁决实质上变成各方力量角逐的均衡结果。通过分析反倾销游说下政策博弈参与者的行为抉择,研究发现:进口产品的售价、政府对国家福利的重视程度与反倾销税成反比,而国外企业利益集团的影响则有助于减少反倾销税;国内市场规模越大,政府裁决部门越倾向于提高反倾销保护水平,而有效的游说途径有助于获得理想裁决结果;"搭便车"行为对企业的反倾销申诉积极性存在直接损害,国内企业宁可直接向政府裁决部门提供政治献金,也不愿去搜寻举证信息。

Antidumping decision should be the perfect choice for authorities to implement strategic industrial protection. But the antidumping decision is the equilibrium outcome under the interests＇ lobbying competition,and antidumping decision actually is the equilibrium result of various delegates＇ competition.Through analyzing the participator＇ s utility maximization behavior,the paper proves the price of imported products and the importance the government attaches to the national welfare is inversely proportional with tariff,while the marginal revenue of domestic enterprise from protection is in proportion with tariff. The final tariff will go down with the number of foreign enterprise lobbying for preferred trade policy,and will go up with the volume of domestic market,and an effective way of lobbying helps to win an ideal decision.After analyzing the affection of the information searching and free riding behavior,domestic enterprise would rather directly contribute government offices than collect information,while free riding damage the enterprise＇ s enthusiasm for antidumping application.