全支付竞争中的有限理性与过度投资:理论与实证

Bounded Rationality and Overdissipation in All-Pay Contests:Theory and Evidence

全支付竞争中要求所有参与人,无论输赢,都支付真实的成本。在这种"全支付"的模式下,参与人的选择偏误对竞争结果的影响很大。本文在全支付拍卖的框架下,研究竞拍参与人数与总投入的关系。首先利用有限理性假设下的Logit均衡模型,证明参与人数增加会加剧竞争中的过度投资,然后利用"美分拍卖"的数据检验理论预测的结果。进行实证分析时,本文采用两种影响参与人数的外生事件作为工具变量进行因果关系的识别。

In all-pay contests,each agent has to incur expenditures to compete for rewards,whether or not that agent wins the rewards.Using the framework of the all-pay auction,we examine the relationship of the number of bidders and the aggregate expenditure in an all-pay contest.Based on the theoretical prediction of Logit equilibrium with bounded rationality,we provide empirical evidence to support the casual inference that the total expenditure increases with the number of bidders.