摘要
风投的"认证"被认为可以缓解交易双方的信息不对称程度,已有的文献往往局限于在股票市场中探讨企业与其股权投资者之间的信息不对称能否通过风投的"认证"缓解,本文则利用网贷市场这一情境具体考察了风投能否直接向企业经营活动中的下游提供认证。通过对1500余家网贷平台的周度交易数据建立面板模型,我们发现风投能够向网贷市场中的出借人~①传递"信号",在获得风投后的短时间内,平台周度成交量、出借人数量发生"跳跃"。
VC＇s certification is believed to be able to alleviate information asymmetry between two transaction sides. However, previous literature is limited to discussing ＂certification＂ in the stock market. This essay uses the situation of online lending market to specifically examine whether VC can directly certify to customers in daily operation activities. Through constructing a fixed-effect model using weekly transaction index of over 1500 P2P platforms, we find that VC could send signal to lenders in this market - weekly transaction volume and the number of lenders ＂jump＂ within a short period after VC＇s investment.
出处
《投资研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第3期92-115,共24页
Review of Investment Studies
关键词
网贷市场
信息不对称
风险投资
认证
Online lending
Information asymmetry
Venture Capital
Certification
