会计稳健性与关联交易——来自上市公司的经验证据

Does Accounting Conservatisam Can See Through Different Related-party Transaction? Evidence from Listed Companies

利用上市公司关联交易数据,采用多种方法度量会计稳健性,本文研究了会计稳健性在关联交易中的治理作用。本文发现会计稳健性能够抑制关联交易:会计稳健性越高,关联交易发生的概率越低,关联交易的金额、次数、比例越低。本文将关联交易区分为效率促进型的正常关联交易,掏空型的异常关联交易,发现会计稳健性能够抑制掏空类关联交易,而对效率促进类关联交易没有抑制作用。本文还从2006年新会计准则采用的角度研究了会计稳健性对关联交易的影响,发现新会计准则的采用虽然整体上降低了上市公司会计稳健性,但这时的会计稳健性对关联交易的抑制作用更大。本文研究表明,会计稳健性能够识别不同性质的关联交易,这丰富了现有关于会计稳健性经济后果的研究,也找到新的途径治理当前关联交易乱象。

Employing Related-Party transaction （RPT） data of listed companies and using multiple solutions to measure accounting conservatism, this paper analyzes accounting conservatism governance effect in RPT. It shows that accounting conservatism can depress RPT： the higher accounting conservatism is, the lower probability RPT happens, and the lower trade quantity, trade numbers and trade ratio are. This paper also divides RPT into normal RPT exerting efficiency enhancing influence and abnormal RPT as a tool of tunneling. It shows that accounting conservatism can depress tunneling RPT while cannot decrease efficiency enhancing RPT. This paper also uses new accounting standard adoption of 2006 as an event, and finds that new accounting standard lessen corporate accounting conservatism, but accounting conservatism can have bigger effect on RPT. The results show that accounting conservatism can differentiate different Relate-Party Transactions. This enriches the research of consequence of accounting conservatism, and is a new way to govern RPT chaos.