摘要
WTO争端解决机构通常倾向于严格审查成员方的规制工具是否符合各涵盖协定之义务,对于审查成员方选择的规制目标则持谦抑审慎的态度;但TBT协定第2.2条明确要求成员方的规制目标具有正当性。相关TBT争端专家组对规制目标的正当性采取经验事实审查标准,这意味着规制目标是否正当由成员方自身判断,有违TBT协定之规定。上诉机构确立了"中心—外围"审查路径,在保留争端解决机构对规制目标正当性最终判定权的同时也对成员方对规制目标的选择权予以一定程度的尊重。但是,上诉机构应当扩大自动获得正当性的"中心"规制目标的范围至WTO法律体系内的所有目标,而非限于TBT协定第2.2条规定的目标,以便进一步扩大成员方的规制目标选择权。
The Dispute Settlement Body (hereafter DSB) of WTO prefers to strictly review whether the regulatory tools adopted by the Members are consistent with the Covered Agreements, while accords great deference and prudence to review the Members' regulatory purpose. However, Article 2.2 of TBT Agreement stipulates explicitly that the regulatory purpose chosen by the Members shall be legitimate. The empirical fact test adopted by Panels of relevant TBT disputes to assess the legitimacy of regulatory purpose gives the Members the final say about legitimacy, which contravenes the text of Article 2.2. The central -peripheral approach established by Appellate Body conserves the final say to the DSB on one hand and accords some deference to the Members' regulatory purpose on the other. The "central" regulatory purpose, which could be deemed as legitimate automatically, should be enlarged to all regulatory purposes in WTO legal system, so as to expand the Members' autonomy to set regulatory purpose.
出处
《国际经贸探索》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第7期94-106,共13页
International Economics and Trade Research