高管股权激励合约特征与公司现金持有——基于PSM-DID的识别策略

Executive Equity Incentive Contract Characteristics and Corporate Cash Holdings:Based on the Identification Strategy of PSM-DID Method

从现金持有的代理理论出发,试图发现高管股权激励的作用路径及其合约特征差异,以沪深A股实施股权激励的公司为样本,计量分析得出:高管股权激励计划实施之后,现金持有尤其是超额现金持有水平降低,设置行权约束以及实施二次激励公司的现金持有水平降低幅度更大,激励类型和有效期的影响相对较小,而激励强度没有表现出差异;在低投资机会和低融资约束公司中,高管股权激励之后现金持有水平降低的幅度更大;PSM-DID模型分析也支持了高管股权激励会引起现金持有水平变化的结论。公司现金管理活动中存在代理行为,高管股权激励能够发挥一定的抑制作用,并且合约特征不同也会存在差异,研究结论为高管股权激励和现金管理提供了借鉴。

Based on the agency theory of cash holding, this paper attempts to find out the functional paths of executive equity incentive and the differences of contract characteristics. Taking the companies that implement the equity incentive in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares as sample, the econometric analysis shows that： After the implementation of executive equity incentive plan, corporate cash holdings, especially excess cash holdings, have reduced ; The level of cash holdings reduce more significantly with constant incentive and exercising constraints in equity incentive contract, moderately with stock option and validity period, but no difference with incentive in- tensity. Furthermore, cash holdings level reduces more in low investment opportunities and low financial constraint companies. PSM-DID analysis results also support the conclusion that there exists the net effect of executive equity incentive on cash holdings. Cash holdings have agency problems and executive equity incentive can play a certain inhibitory role, and the contract characteristics will also be differ- ent. The conclusion provides a reference for executive equity incentive and cash management.