国企混合所有制改革中高管货币性薪酬激励研究

Research on the Monetary Incentive of Senior Executives in the Reform of the Mixed Ownership System of State-owned Enterprises

激励是解决股东与代理人冲突的重要途径,在国有企业混合所有制改革大背景下,对高管进行有效的薪酬激励至关重要。通过对2011~2016年722家上市国有企业样本分析,发现:对国企高管实行货币性薪酬激励有利于企业绩效的增长;不同性质的国企高层货币性薪酬激励存在差异,即央企高层货币性薪酬业绩敏感性小于地方性国企高层货币性薪酬业绩敏感性;其中股权制衡能够有效调节国企高管薪酬绩效敏感性;并且国企高管普遍存在长期激励不足现象,而高管持股与企业绩效显著正相关。根据研究结果,对国企混改如何提高高管薪酬激励的有效性提出相关建议。

Incentive is an important way to solve the conflict between shareholders and agents. Under the background of mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises,effective compensation incentives for executives are very important. Through the analysis of 2011-2016 722 listed state-owned enterprises sample found that the executives of state-owned enterprises implement monetary compensation is conducive to the growth of enterprise performance; monetary remuneration of senior different state-owned enterprises incentive differences,namely the central rate senior monetary compensation performance sensitivity to small local state-owned enterprise executives monetary compensation performance sensitivity; including equity balance can effectively adjust the state executive pay performance sensitivity; and the executives of state-owned enterprises widespread shortage and long-term incentive,managerial ownership and firm performance were significantly correlated. According to the results of the study,the paper puts forward some suggestions on howto improve the effectiveness of executive compensation incentive.