治理环境与高薪养廉——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

Governance Environment and High Payment to Restrain Corruption: Empirical Evidence from Listed Companies in China

本文利用我国上市公司2009-2015年的数据，在检验企业高管薪酬与高管腐败关系的基础上，重点研究了企业内外部治理环境对这种关系的影响，研究表明：企业高管薪酬与高管腐败正相关，即我国企业高管高薪不能起到养廉的作用，市场化进程和内部控制是有效的外部和内部治理机制，能够抑制高管薪酬与高管腐败之间的正向关系，内部控制的治理效果在国有企业更加明显;市场化进程的治理效果在非国有企业更加明显，党的十八大以来的反腐败斗争有效震慑了国有企业高管的腐败行为，本文为我国企业高管腐败的治理提供了经验证据，可以为企业反腐败工作的持续推进提供借鉴。

On the basis of examining the relationship between executive compensationand executive corruption, this paper focuses on the effects of internal and externalgovernance environment on above relationship by using all listed companies in China during2009 - 2015, The findings show that, the executive compensation is positively associatedwith executive corruption, that is, companies, high executive compensation cannot preventexecutive corruption behaviors in China, The marketization process and internal control areeffective external and internal governance mechanisms, which can help to restrain thepositive relationship between executive compensation and executive corruption, Thegovernance effect of internal control is more significant in state - owned enterprises, and thegovernance effect of marketization process is more significant in non - state - ownedenterprises, The anti - corruption campaign since the 18th National Congress of CPC haseffectively terrorized the corruption behaviors of state - owned enterprise executives, Thispaper provides empirical evidence for the governance of executive corruption in China andcan make references for the continuous promotion of anti - corruption campaign inenterprises.