规则与私人性:关于《哲学研究》中202节的评论

Rules and Privacy:Remarks on Philosophical Investigations § 202

通过质疑语言和规则之间存在强力联系的假定,该文认为我们从维特根斯坦关于遵守规则的讨论中并不能得出标准的解读观点,即认为私人语言是不可能的。该文从区分语言和规则以及私人规则和公共规则之间的不同角度,为私人语言和私自遵守规则行为的存在作了辩护。该文指出,我们并不是通过遵守规则而理解语言,维特根斯坦在《哲学研究》202节中说个体间的公共的规则不可能私自地遵守或许是对的,但是如果存在私人规则的话,那么这些规则当然可以被人们私自地遵守。我们的推理过程和实际的生活中存在这样的私人规则。该文得出结论认为,私人规则的遵守不是不可能的,只不过不同于公共规则的遵守而已。维特根斯坦需要在一种特殊的限定的公共意义上来使用＂规则＂。

By questioning the supposition of the strong relationship between language and rules,this paper tries to argue that we cannot get a standard interpretative reading —there is no private language,based on Wittgenstein’s discussion about following rules in PI.This paper is to offer defensive arguments for the existence of private language and following rules privately through the distinction between language and rules,private rules and public rules.The paper points out that we does not understand language by following rules,and thinks that Wittgenstein may be right in PI § 202 that public rules,interpersonal ones,cannot be obeyed privately.But if there are private rules then surely those rules can be obeyed privately.There are many such private rules in our process of reasoning and real life.Finally,the paper draws a conclusion that it is not impossible for people to follow rules privately which is different from following rules publicly.What Wittgenstein needs for § 202 is to use "rule"in a special limited public sense.