共同委托模式下存货质押融资双重激励机制研究

Study on Double Incentive Mechanism of Inventory Pledge Financing under Joint Entrustment

构建了物流企业和银行、物流企业与中小企业之间不完全信息的委托代理模型,得到最优激励决策和物流企业的最优努力水平,并对采用共同委托模式的双重激励机制与委托监管模式的银行单一激励和没有激励机制的物流企业努力水平进行比较分析,研究结果表明,这种双重激励机制不仅可以减少银行的激励成本,也有助于提高物流企业的监管努力水平。

In this paper, we constructed the principal-agent model with incomplete information involving a logistics company, the bank, and a small and medium-sized enterprise, obtained the optimal incentive decision and the optimal effort level of the logistics company,and compared the effort levels of the logistics company respectively with the double incentive under the joint entrustment mode, with the single incentive from the bank under the delegated supervision mode and with no incentive, finding that the double incentive mechanism could not only reduce the incentive costs of the bank, but also help improve the regulation effort level of the logistics company.