反身一元论:威尔曼斯意识思想简论

Reflexive Monism: On Max Velmans' Thoughts of Consciousness

尽管复兴的意识研究已经持续了30余年,然而一些根本问题仍然存在较大争议。这些问题可以概括为四个维度:(1)如何理解意识,即意识的定义问题;(2)意识的形而上学本性,或心-身关系问题;(3)意识的神经机制问题;(4)意识研究的方法论问题。威尔曼斯是当代意识研究的"诸子百家"之一,"反身一元论"是其意识思想的核心,他同样试图对上述四个方面的问题给出解答:(1)从意识的现象学出发,对比了有意识状态与无意识状态,辨析意识与心智、清醒、注意、记忆、语言和知识等概念之间的区别,并结合对意识功能的分析,得出"意识即觉知"的观点,这接近于"意识即纯粹觉知或纯粹意识"的观点。(2)通过分析"知觉的二元论模型"和"知觉的物理主义还原论模型",威尔曼斯认为二元论的根本困境是心-物分离,物理主义的困境则在于无视内在意识体验的实在性。为了弥合二元论不可避免的"心-物"鸿沟,威尔曼斯采取一元论;为了恢复被物理主义否定的内在意识体验的存在论地位,他采取了两面论;而将一元论和两面论有机结合起来的关键则是以"知觉投射"为核心的反身模型;因而,他对心-物关系的解决方案也可称为"反身两面一元论"。(3)对于意识的神经机制问题,他认为首先值得关注的是与日常体验直接相关的神经而非量子层面,同时赞同对支持纯粹意识的神经条件与支持特定意识内容的神经条件之间进行区分。(4)对于意识研究的方法论问题,威尔曼斯重视第一人称方法的重要性,反对把第一人称方法与"主观的"等同而将其排斥在科学之外;他认为,没有完全脱离主体第一人称视角的客观的科学方法,科学的客观性本质上是一种主体间的客观性;第一人称方法与第三人称方法是研究意识的两种彼此互补且彼此无法归约的视角,并且两种方法之间不存在传统的所谓"客观性"与"主观性"的截然对立。威尔曼斯反身一元论在基本方面类似"两视一元论",其哲学意蕴深厚,逻辑融贯,而且有广泛的实证数据的支持,他通过概念框架的变革,有效消解了意识"难问题"。

Although the revival of consciousness studies has lasted for more than 30 years, there still exist some fundamental problems which can be summarized from the following four dimensions：（1） How to understand the phenomenal nature consciousness, namely, how to define consciousness;（2）What the metaphysical nature of consciousness is, or how to solve the mind-body problem;（3）What the neural mechanisms of consciousness are;（4）How to understand methodological problems in the consciousness studies. Max Velmans, one of the representative figures in the field of contemporary consciousness research, put forward the theory of ＂reflexive monism＂ aiming at resolving the above problems.（1） By studying the phenomenology of consciousness, via contrasting conscious and unconscious states, comparing consciousness with mind, wakefulness, attention, memory, language and knowledge respectively, and analyzing the function of consciousness, Velmans finally concluded that consciousness is awareness, which resonates with the point of view of this research that consciousness equals to pure awareness.（2） According to the analysis of ＂a dualist model of perception＂ and ＂a reductionist model of perception＂, he clearly revealed that the fundamental dilemma of dualism lies in the mind-matter separation, and the dilemma of physicalism involves negating the existence of intrinsic conscious experience. Velmans adopted monism to bridge the ＂mind-matter＂ gap of dualism, and ＂dual-aspect＂ theory to restore the existence of intrinsic conscious experience. Since the reflexive model with ＂perceptual projection＂ serves as the key to the combination of monism and the ＂dual-aspect＂ theory, his theory can also be called ＂reflexive dual-aspect monism＂.（3） With respect to the neural mechanism of consciousness, Velmans argued that one should focus on the neural level directly related to the daily experience, rather than quantum level. He also agreed that the neural conditions supporting pure consciousness need to be distinguished from these neural conditions supporting specific content of consciousness.（4） Velmans attached importance to the first-person method, and opposed the equivalence between the ＂first-person method＂ and the subjective, pointing out that it might lead to the false belief that the first person method is not scientific. He claimed that there is no the objective scientific methods divorced from the first-person subject perspective, and the objectivity of science is essentially an intersubjective objectivity. The first-person and third-person methods are complementary to each other and irreducible to each other in the consciousness studies. The opposition of ＂objectivity＂ to ＂subjectivity＂ does not exist between the two methods. In brief, essentially similar to the ＂dual-perspective monism＂ proposed by Li Hengwei, Velmans＇ consciousness theory with profound philosophical implication and internally logical consistency can be supported by extensive empirical data, and through transforming its conceptual framework, can effectively eliminate the ＂hard problem＂ of consciousness.