CEO权力、政治关联与企业风险承担的实证研究

CEO Power,Political Connection and Corporate Risk Taking Behavior

本文以我国沪深A股上市公司2011-2015年数据为样本,基于政治关联调节效应,考察CEO权力对企业风险承担水平的关联机制。研究发现,CEO权力与企业风险承担的关联更符合行为决策理论观点,即CEO权力越大,公司风险承担水平越高。相比国有企业,该正向关系在市场化程度较高的私有企业中较明显。进一步,政治关联起负向调节作用;相比竞争性行业,政治关联的负向调节作用在非竞争性行业中更显著。研究结论对企业进行风险管理具有重要的启示意义。

Using the sample of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share non-financial listed companies from 2011 to 2015, this paper empirically investigates the impact of CEO power on corporate risk-taking, and examines the moderating effects of political connection. The study finds that the association between CEO power and corporate risk-taking is in line with the theory of behavior decision theory at higher degree. That is, the higher CEO power is, the higher risk level of the company takes. Compared with state-owned enterprises, the positive relationship between the higher degree of market-oriented private enterprises is more obvious. Furthermore, political relations play a negative regulatory role; the negative adjustment of political connection is more pronounced in noncompetitive industries than competitive industries. It is of great significance to the risk management of enterprise.