基于贝叶斯纳什均衡的政府补贴福利分析——以垂直不完全竞争市场为例

Welfare Analysis of Government Subsidies via Bayes-Nash Equilibrium:A Case of Imperfectly Competitive Vertical Markets

【目的】基于贝叶斯纳什均衡理论研究了垂直不完全竞争市场中政府补贴的福利影响。【方法】采用了比较预期福利的方法。【结果】在Asker所建立的框架下分析了政府补贴对最终消费者福利和社会总福利的影响,得到了社会总福利的增量超过政府补贴投入的充分条件。【结论】推广了Asker的一些结果。

[Purposes]Welfare analysis of government subsidies in imperfectly competitive vertical markets are investigated via BayesNash equilibrium theory.[Method]By comparing expected social welfare surplus.[Findings]It follows the framework in Asker（2008）,analyzes the effect of government subsidies on final consumers and the society,and obtains the sufficient conditions for the increase on social welfare surplus being greater than government expenditure.[Conclusion]Our main results extend the corresponding results in Asker（2008）to more general cases.