摘要
"晋升锦标赛"理论认为中国已经形成了一种基于经济绩效评估的干部提拔机制。但这一理论不断受到各种挑战。论文结合熊彼特的创新理论从时间维度上拓展了这一理论,认为改革开放后,"晋升锦标赛"作为一种机制创新经历了打破、繁荣、再均衡三个阶段,并收集了1982—2011年中国16个副省级市市长的晋升以及他们在任期间的经济绩效的相关数据对两者的关系进行总时间段和分时间段比较。初步得出以下结论:在1982—2011年总时间范围内,市长经济绩效与晋升之间的关系较为显著。但是,将这30年划分为3个10年的时间段后,市长的经济绩效与晋升之间的关系呈现出从不显著的正相关,到显著的正相关,再到不显著的负相关的趋势。较好地验证了论文从时间维度上对"晋升锦标赛"理论的修正。
The Political Tournament Model posits that China has forged a cadre promotion mechanism based on local leaders'performance in promoting economic performance.Inspired by Schumpeter's Innovation Theory,we revisit how the Political Tournament Model has changed over time.Since China entered the reform and openingup era in 1978,the Political Tournament mechanism has undergone three stages:disruption,learning,and equilibrium.We collected the promotion and economic performance data of mayors of 16 major Chinese cities(deputy-province level)for the period 1982-2011.The following conclusions were drawn.During the entire period,the relationship between economic performance and promotion was significantly positive.However,after dividing the period into three 10-year stages,the relationship in the first stage was insignificant but positive,then it became significant and positive in the second stage,before eventually becoming insignificant and negative in the final stage.This confirms our theoretical challenge to the Political Tournament Model.
出处
《公共行政评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第3期7-27,209,共21页
Journal of Public Administration
基金
国家自科基金项目(71403143)
清华大学自主科研项目(2014z21018)
关键词
晋升锦标赛
时间维度
创新理论
经济绩效
Political Tournament Model
Innovation Theory
Economic Performance
Cadre Promotion