高管薪酬-业绩敏感性、公益性捐赠与代理成本——来自中国沪深A股市场的经验证据

Executive Compensation-Performance Sensitivity, Public Welfare Donations and Agency Costs:Empirical Evidence from A-Shares Market in China

文章将基于业绩的公司高管薪酬溢折价支付界定为高管薪酬—业绩敏感性,并视其为公司高管薪酬契约的一种治理机制。选择2007-2016年沪深A股上市公司作为研究样本,实证检验了高管薪酬—业绩敏感性、公益性捐赠与代理成本三者之间的关系,结果显示:(1)公益性捐赠提升了企业代理成本;(2)高管薪酬—业绩敏感性抑制了公益性捐赠提升代理成本的效应;(3)上述两种效应在国有与非国有两类企业当中均不存在显著差异。文章构建了高管薪酬—业绩敏感性预测模型,提供了中国资本市场捐赠行为影响代理成本的经验证据,验证了两权分离的公司高管薪酬契约这种现代公司治理机制安排降低代理成本的效应。据此提出如下政策建议:(1)资本市场的监管部门以及慈善捐赠机构要引导企业树立对公益性捐赠的理性认识;(2)继续推进中国的市场化改革,完善现代企业公司治理机制。

In this paper, performance-based executive salary paid premiums are defined as executive compensation-performance sensitivity and viewed as a governance mechanism for executive pay contracts. This paper chooses Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2016 as the research samples and tests empirically the relationship between executive compensation-performance sensitivity,public welfare donations and agency costs.The results show that：（1）public welfare donations enhance enterprise agency costs;（2）executive compensation-performance sensitivity inhibits the effect of public welfare donations enhancing agency costs;（3）the above two effects are not significantly different between state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises.This paper constructs the prediction model of executive compensation-performance sensitivity,provides empirical evidence that the donation behavior affects agency costs from Chinese capital market,and verifies the effect of modern corporate governance mechanisms that reduce the agency costs by executive compensation contracts.Accordingly,the following policy suggestions are proposed：（1）The regulatory authorities of capital markets and charity donation agencies should guide enterprises to establish a rational understanding of public welfare donations;（2）China should continue to promote market-oriented reforms and improve the corporate governance mechanism in modern enterprises.