股票期权风险承担激励、管理者权力与企业研发创新

Stock Options Risk Incentive,Managerial Power and Corporate Innovation

以2006-2016年公布股票期权激励方案的上市公司为样本,探讨高管期权薪酬风险承担激励和管理者权力对企业研发创新的影响。研究表明,管理者期权薪酬风险承担激励和管理者权力均对企业研发创新具有促进作用;当二者同时存在时,期权薪酬激励与管理者权力之间会产生负向协同效应,反而会阻碍企业研发创新。其原因可能在于,管理者可以利用手中的权利影响薪酬合约制定过程而轻松获取租金,从而放弃风险较高的研发创新活动。研究结论丰富了企业创新、管理者权力和高管股权激励相关研究,对于提高企业创新能力、改进公司治理具有一定借鉴意义。

Using sample of Chinese listed companies from 2006 to 2016,this study investigates the effect of ESOs and CEO power on corporate innovation.We find that both ESOs risk incentive（vega）and CEO power are positively correlated with corporate innovation respectively,but when CEO power and ESOs coexist,the powerful manager will control compensation contract to obtain rent more easily,thus give up risky innovation.So the negative synergistic effect of ESOs and CEO power will discourage corporate innovation.The study adds to literatures on corporate innovation,manager power and top manager equity incentive.The result of the study has certain reference significance that it is helpful to improve organizational innovation competence and corporate governance.