风险投资对高管薪酬—业绩敏感性的影响——基于实施股权激励上市公司的实证研究

The Effect of Venture Capital on Executive Compensation- performance Sensitivity： An Empirical Study Based on Implementing Stock Incentives for Listed Companies

本研究以2011—2015年沪深A股实施股权激励的上市公司为样本，采用Heckman两阶段模型，考察了风险投资参与对高管薪酬-业绩敏感性的影响。研究发现：相比无风险投资参与的企业，风险投资参与企业的高管货币薪酬与会计业绩敏感性和高管股权激励与市场业绩敏感性显著较高，而高管货币薪酬与市场业绩敏感性和高管股权激励与会计业绩敏感性显著较低。本文研究结论说明风险投资参与使得被投资公司的高管薪酬结构更加合理，提高了其与长短期业绩的匹配度，从而提升了被投资公司的治理水平。

Based on the sample of Chinese A-shares listed companies which had announced the implementation of equity incentives during 2011 to 2015, this study empirically tests the impact of venture capital （VC） on executive compensation-performance sensitivity from the perspective of compensation structure by using Heckman two-stage model. The results show that： VC significantly increases sensitivity of monetary compensation with accounting perfor- mance, and the sensitivity of equity incentive with market performance, but VC significantly reduces the sensitivity of equity incentive with accounting performance, and the sensitivity of monetary compensation with manet performance. The conclusion of this paper shows that VC makes the compensation structure of the invested company more reasonable and improves its matching with the short-term performance so as to improve the governance of the invested company.