高管减持与股价崩盘风险研究

Research on Executive Reduction and Stock Price Crash Risk

本文选取2006—2016年沪深A股上市公司高管减持交易数据,通过理论分析和实证检验考察了高管减持对股价崩盘风险的影响。研究表明,高管减持规模对股价崩盘风险具有正向促进作用;在经过稳健性检验后,上述结论依然成立。而且,当减持交易有CEO参与时,二者间的正相关关系更加显著。进一步研究发现,信息操纵在高管减持规模影响股价崩盘风险中发挥了部分中介作用。

Based on the executive reduction transaction data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares listed companies from 2006 to 2016, this paper examines the impact of senior executives＇ reduction on the risk of stock price crash through theoretical analysis and empirical test. The research shows that the scale of executive reduction has a positive effect on stock price crash risk, which is still valid after the robustness test. The positive correlation between the two is more significant when the CEO is involved in the reduction transaction. Further research shows that information manipulation plays a mediating role between the scale of executive reduction and the stock price crash risk. The conclusion of this paper not only enriches the related fields of literature about stock price crash risk and the executive reduction,but also has an important practical significance for strengthening insider trading supervision and preventing stock price crash risk.