基于前景理论的食品企业违规行为分析与治理

Food enterprises' behavior and management based on prospect theory

在有限理性假设框架下,基于前景理论对食品企业制假造劣等违规风险决策行为选择的心理与过程进行了分析,进一步建立食品企业风险决策模型以分析政府惩罚力度对食品企业的影响。研究发现,食品企业的制假制劣行为取决于心理参考点及对违规风险的主观感知等因素。在对食品企业违法违规行为的治理中,惩罚和治理的效果在一定程度上取决于食品企业对违规造假行为的风险态度,并存在"惩罚困局",即食品安全惩罚力度并非在任何情况下都是越大越好,当惩罚力度加大到一定程度时,会出现惩罚失灵现象。

Based on the framework of bounded rationality, the behaviors of food enterprises were analyzed under Prospect Theory. A risk decision model was constructed and the effect of the government’s penalty to food enterprises was discussed. The study found that food enterprises’ behavior of making counterfeit and inferior products depends on such factors as their psychological references and subjective perception of the risk of violation. In the governance of these operations, the effect of penalty and governance depends to a certain extent on the risk attitude of food companies, and there exists a punishment predicament. It means that the state of food safety cannot be better even if the punishment is more severe, and that the increased penalty to a certain degree will nevertheless contribute to more malfunction of penalty.