企业投融资互动机制下的信贷违约风险——基于中国上市公司的实证研究

Impacts of Interactions Between Investment and Debt Financing on Credit Default Risk——Empirical Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms

本文以中国上市公司为样本,实证分析了在负债融资与投资决策相互作用的机制下企业信贷违约风险的变化规律。实证结果表明,整体上投资支出会促进信贷违约风险,负债融资会对其产生抑制;在负债融资导致的过度投资情形下,企业投资对信贷违约风险的促进作用将更明显,而过度投资会抑制企业最优负债融资水平,从而带来更低的最优信贷违约风险;短期负债融资会促进企业信贷违约风险的增加。文章为信贷违约风险控制探寻了一种从企业微观财务决策角度进行分析的全新视角。

This paper empirically studies the impacts of interactions between investment and debt financing decisions on credit default risk. The results show that the investment expenditure increases credit default risk while the debt financing decreases it. Because of overinvestment problems stemming from the debt financing,the investment would exert stronger positive influences on credit default risk,and overinvestment problems would in turn decrease the optimal debt level,resulting in the optimal credit default risk. Short-term debt financing would increase the credit default risk. The study provides a new perspective to manage the credit default risk from the anle of firms＇ micro-financial decisions