摘要
当前运用博弈理论的网络安全研究大多采用完全理性假设,本文针对现实社会中攻防双方的有限理性限制条件和攻防过程的动态变化特征,基于非合作演化博弈理论,从有限理性约束出发,将演化博弈模型与Markov决策相结合,构建多阶段Markov攻防演化博弈模型,实现对多阶段、多状态攻防对抗的动态分析推演;依据博弈的折扣总收益设计目标函数,提出多阶段博弈均衡的求解方法,给出最优防御策略选取算法.通过实验验证了模型和方法的有效性.
Most research of network security based on the traditional game theory use completely rational assumption.For the condition of bounded rationality and the characteristic of dynamic changing process,we combined the evolutionary game model with Markov decision-making process based on the theory of non-cooperative evolutionary game,which is on the restraint of bounded rationality. Thus we constructed a multi-stage Markov attack-defense evolutionary game model to achieve multi-stage and multi-state dynamic analysis and evolution. Besides,on the basis of the sum discount payoffs to design objective function,the method to solve the evolutionary stable equilibrium was proposed,and the optimal defense strategy selection algorithm was provided. Finally,the validity of the model and method is validated by numerical simulation.
作者
张恒巍
黄健明
ZHANG Heng-wei;HUANG Jian-ming(The Third Institute,Information Engineering University.Zhengzhou,Henan 450001,China;Science and Technology on Information Assurance Laboratory,Beijing 100093,China)
出处
《电子学报》
EI
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2018年第6期1503-1509,共7页
Acta Electronica Sinica
基金
国家自然科学基金(No.61303074
No.61309013)
信息保障技术重点实验室开放基金(No.KJ-15-110)
关键词
网络安全
网络攻防
博弈论
有限理性
演化博弈
网络防御
Markov决策
多阶段最优防御
network security
network attack-defense
game theory
bounded rationality
evolutionary game
network defense
Markov decision-making
multi-stage optimal defense