摘要
人工智能被想象成为"像人一样的主体"。在此基础上,人们借助主体范式和关系范式开始建构人工智能的权利话语体系。但是,无论哪一种视角,其根源都是人类中心主义的。这就导致人工智能和人类的交往行为,不足以像正常的成年人一样,具有道德权利的双向社会性意义,因此,人工智能必然缺乏道德主体资格。与此同时,尽管法律规范可以设定人工智能的相关法律权利,但这一权利设置更多体现为无权利的义务,并且是为了保护人类的利益,因此,人工智能的法律权利就是修辞性的,而非真正的法律主体权利。
Artificial intelligence is imagined to be an agent the same as the human. On this basis,the right discourse system of artificial intelligence is constructed by two perspectives of subject paradigm and relationship paradigm. However,the root of both paradigms is the anthropocentrism. Then,the act of the interaction between AI and human could not show the dual social significance of moral rights,just like the interaction between normal adults. Therefore,AI is bound to lack the qualification of moral subjects. At the same time,even though the AI would have legal rights by legislative,the context of norms reveals the obligation of no-right,in order to protect the interests of human beings,which means that the legal rights of artificial intelligence is rhetoric,not real.
作者
刘振宇
LIU Zhen - yu(College of Philosophy,Law&Politics,Shanghai Normal University,Shanghai 200234,Chin)
出处
《自然辩证法研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第8期31-37,共7页
Studies in Dialectics of Nature
基金
国家社会科学基金青年项目"诺斯权利开放秩序理论的批判性跟踪研究"(15CZZ002)