基于双边风险厌恶的科技保险风险补偿研究

Study on Risk Compensation of Science and Technology Insurance Based on Bilateral Risk Aversion

利用委托—代理理论,对科技保险风险补偿问题进行建模研究,得到了对称信息与非对称信息情形下政府最优风险补偿策略及保险公司最优努力水平的显示解。结果显示,最优边际激励系数不再恒大于零,其随着政府的风险厌恶程度增加而递增,随着保险公司的风险厌恶程度增加而递减,随着科技保险业务盈利水平的增加而递减。

This paper builds a risk compensation model of science and technology insurance by principal-agent theory,and obtains the explicit solutions of the risk compensation and the effort level under the cases of symmetry and asymmetry information respectively. Results indicate that the optimal marginal incentive coefficients are not always greater than zero,which increase with the degree of government risk aversion increase,but decrease with the degree of the insurance company risk aversion increase,and decrease with the earnings level of science and technology insurance service.